Marxism, Early Soviet Oriental Studies and the

Problem of ÔPower/KnowledgeÕ
Few would be surprised to learn that the Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in a radical reconfiguration of relations between intellectuals and the state and between networks of individuals themselves. However, despite the important work of a number of recent specialists including Alpatov (1997) , Tamazishvili (2008 ), Hirsch (2005 and Buttino (2014) , the nature of this reconfiguration often remains poorly understood among non-specialists and some specialists alike. The enduring influence of Michel FoucaultÕs notions of discourse and of power/knowledge plays an important role here. By collapsing the distinction between power and knowledge it becomes impossible adequately to consider their interrelationships and their crucial historical transformations. In place of careful analyses of the numerous reconfigurations that followed 1917, the adoption of a Foucauldian framework tends to lead scholars to speak about a ÔSoviet discourseÕ of this or that area or problem as if a unitary and unshifting paradigm reigned from 1917 to 1991. While there is clearly continuity in the vocabulary utilized by those in political power and in much academic writing of that period, one should not be misled by lexis. As Edward Said noted, there is Ôa sensible differenceÉ between Logos and words: we must not let Foucault get away with confusing them with each other, nor with letting us forget that history does not get made without work, intention, resistance, effort, or conflict, and that none of these things is silently absorbable into micronetworks of powerÕ (1983, p. 245) .
Nowhere is the Foucauldian approach more debilitating than in studies of the production of knowledge about societies that were adversely affected by colonialism and imperialism, for here key transformations of constellations between intellectuals and institutional power are often buried beneath longue durŽe conceptions about discursive formations. The notion of a single ÔEnlightenment discourseÕ is particularly problematic given the highly contested dialogues between the radical, atheistic currents within the Enlightenment, beginning with SpinozaÕs philosophy, and those moderate philosophes determined to reconcile the advance of science with religious prejudices and the established social order on which Jonathan Israel has written in detail. The rise of colonialism acted on this field in complex ways (Israel, 2006, pp. 590Ð614), but these are often glossed over in accounts of intellectual history framed by poststructuralism.
How much more problematic then when the same approach is applied to oriental studies in the early USSR. Michael Kemper, author of a number of valuable works on central Asian Islam and certain aspects of Soviet Oriental Studies, for instance, characterizes Marxism as Ôan extreme form of European Enlightenment thinkingÕ (Kemper 2006, p. 6) and proceeds to present a putative ÔSoviet discourse on the origin and class character of IslamÕ by assimilating a wide variety of exploratory works on the socioeconomic foundations of early Islam into a unitary discourse with little trace of surplus or marks of resistance. Such works were allegedly instances of a ÔMarxist discourseÕ that Ôwas itself pure ÒOrientalismÓ (in the sense of Edward Said),Õ, he argues, holding the Ôessentialist view that it was possible to grasp the ÒcharacterÓ of early Islam, and that this knowledge would provide them with an understanding of contemporary Muslim peoples.Õ Such thinkers Ôunquestionably put their knowledge at the disposal of the state, which used it for ruling and thoroughly transforming these contemporary Muslim societiesÕ (Kemper 2009, p. 46) . There are a number of reasons to object to this attempt to grasp the essential ÔcharacterÕ of early Soviet oriental studies. Firstly, to analyse the socioeconomic conditions under which Islam arose, or to seek to identify the specific social groups among which it originated, is not in itself Ôessentialist.Õ Secondly, such an approach does not necessarily suggest that the social bases of the religion remained unchanged and that social analysis of its origins provided some sort of template for understanding contemporary Islam in the USSR.
Rather, it suggests merely that in order to understand a complex, cultural phenomenon one needs to approach the matter historically, commencing with an analysis of the conditions in which it arose. Thirdly, while it is undeniable that the Stalin regime did indeed employ the work of orientalists to rule and transform Muslim societies, it does not follow that from the very outset of the Revolution there existed a unitary Ôdiscourse of Soviet orientalismÕ that functioned Ôto turn the Orient into an instrument of Soviet RussiaÕ (Kemper 2010, p. 449) . There is a fundamental difference between attempting to win leadership in a revolutionary struggle against a common adversary and treating an ally simply as an instrument. The many debates about the strategy of hegemony before and after the Revolution focused specifically on this distinction (see Brandist 2015) . While there are plenty of reasons to be critical of many contributions to early Soviet oriental studies, simply to read a putative ÔdiscourseÕ back into the debates of the 1920s is questionable indeed. It is, however, legitimate to argue that in the 1930s there was indeed a concerted effort to homogenise Soviet perspectives on the East and to use the knowledge generated as a resource for the imperial domination of the Soviet ÔEastÕ and the subordination of the independence movements across the colonial world to the foreign policy of Moscow.
One might here recall SaidÕs discomfort with FoucaultÕs assumption that Ôthe individual text or author counts for very littleÕ, and the formerÕs insistence that Ôindividual writersÕ do leave a Ôdetermining imprintÕ on an Ôotherwise anonymous body of texts constituting a discursive formation like OrientalismÕ (Said 2003 (Said [1978 : 23). Rather than assimilating every utterance to a closed discursive circle, it is of crucial importance to focus on the Ôdynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political concerns shaped by theÉ great empiresÕ (Said 2003 (Said [1978 , pp. 14- (Lenin 1962 (Lenin [1905 , pp. 48-49). Although Lenin increasingly considered the national and colonial questions, many regional Party organisations before the Revolution relegated the national question to a secondary position in search of a unified Marxist organization across the Empire (Blanc 2016) . This undoubtedly contributed to a lack of connection between rising demands for legal equality and cultural autonomy among such ÔEasternÕ peoples as Buriat-Mongols and Kazakhs after 1905 and the workersÕ movement based in the cities (Sablin and Korobeynikov 2016) . While LeninÕs The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1964a ) and the Lenin-Bukharin analysis of imperialism (Lenin 1964b (Lenin [1916 ; Bukharin 1929 Bukharin [1915 Bukharin , 1917 ) were important milestones in Marxist thinking about the colonial world, it was failure to establish new Soviet governments in some regions during the 1918-21 Civil War (Poland, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Finland and others), followed by successes in some areas, often assisted by Red Army intervention, soon after, that placed the need to address the aspirations of the non-Russian populations at the forefront of the political agenda of the entire movement. In a number of cases the central authorities had to intervene to rectify Russian-chauvinist policies developed by local Soviets that were dominated by Russian colonists (Safarov 1921, pp. 104- (2016) show, this idea of hybridity became quite widespread in the late imperial period as a way of understanding the imperial situation. The imposition of cultural institutions on subject peoples could now be subject to critique, while separatist ideologies based on the assertion of an integral unity could be undermined.
Liberal advocacy of multi-culturalism became an alternative to full national selfdetermination, while progress was to be measured by the Ôpeaceful convergenceÕ of the peoples of the East with Russia. While they viewed the direction of social evolution as universal, and the relative positions of different societies in the hierarchy of states as historically contingent rather than reflecting essential capacities, they held that the incorporation of societies with a ÔlowerÕ level of culture into a political space dominated by a society with a ÔhigherÕ level of culture to be advantageous for all concerned. Bartolʹd argued that the Tsarist state should support Oriental Studies because Ôthe peoples of the east will believe in the superiority of our culture all the more when they are convinced we know them better than they know themselvesÕ (1963a [1900] , p. 610). Persuasion did not, however, preclude the necessity of using force to achieve imperial goals, for Ôthe measures taken by specific [Russian imperial] governments to close down and open up markets, including the aggressive campaignsÕ in Turkestan, were Ômerely unconscious steps on the road to the establishment of the ever more apparent historical mission of Russia Ð to be the intermediary in the overland trade and cultural intercourse between Europe and AsiaÕ (Bartolʹd 1963b (Bartolʹd [1927 , p. 432).
These thinkers formed the nucleus of the ÔoldÕ post-revolutionary Russian orientology, centred on Petrograd/Leningrad, producing much valuable work on the philology, religion and philosophy of the Orient that sought to break the hold of Eurocentric perspectives. Levels and modes of engagement with Marxism among such scholars varied considerably, but they were encouraged to teach, research and publish throughout the 1920s and they played important roles in the policy of decolonization that came to be known as korenizatsiia (ÔindigenizationÕ or ÔnativizationÕ), through which local languages, cultures and cadre were promoted.
Although the emerging ÔnewÕ, Marxist oriental studies aimed to bring cultural factors within its orbit, this long-established and well-developed base in Leningrad led these scholars to exert a greater influence than might be expected. In order to lead them forward, we need to know their history; not only abstractly, but concretely and to understand their interests. Here communist policy confronts Marxist theory with a specific task: to understand the historical development of the oppressed peoples of the colonial East, and on the basis of the acquired knowledge to indicate the path of revolutionary development (Safarov 1922, p. 32 ).
The ÔEastern questionÕ was thus something posed by world capitalism, to which Marxists had to respond. Instead of how to integrate ÔbackwardÕ societies into world capitalism and subordinate them to the interests of imperial powers, the question must become how to understand and advance the interests of the laboring masses of the colonies themselves and in so doing to win leadership in the common struggle.
Fundamentally there was, at this time, no difference in approach to the Soviet and colonial East, even if there were practical and tactical differences. The task was to win hegemony over the oppressed, just as the proletariat had won hegemony over Russian and non-Russian peasants in the liberation movement against the Russian autocracy. The goal was to achieve something approximating a smychka (alliance or union) between the proletariat of industrialised countries and the labouring masses of the colonial world against the common enemy: international capitalism.
The major works of the new Oriental studies such as Gurko-KriazhinÕs work on Turkey, Sultan-ZadeÕs work on Persia or SafarovÕs work on Turkestan and (later) on
China tended towards being curious hybrids of scholarship and publitsistika (political journalism). The Ôpopular-scientificÕ (nauchno-populiarnyi) genre was a characteristic result, and was especially prevalent in the publications of Party institutions, reflecting the two objectives common to Marxist theory of the period. Reflecting on his time in
Moscow working with the Comintern in 1922-3, Antonio Gramsci noted that Marxists sought a) to Ôcombat modern ideologies in their most refined form, in order to be able to constitute its own group of independent intellectualsÕ and b) Ôto educate the popular massesÕ, whose culture was marked by Ôresidues of the pre-capitalist world that still exist among the popular masses, especially in the field of religion.Õ The Ôsecond task, which was fundamental, given the character of the new philosophyÉ absorbed all its strengthÕ and led Marxists to form intellectual alliances with Ôextraneous tendenciesÕ (Gramsci 1971, p. 392) . Marxism thus Ôcombined into a form of culture which was a little higher than the popular average (which was very low) but was absolutely inadequate to combat the ideologies of the educated classesÕ (Gramsci 1971, p. 392-93 What is most significant here, however, is that Marr sought to discredit IndoEuropean philology as a whole on the grounds that it is Ôflesh and bone the expression of moribund bourgeois socialityÕ that had been Ôbuilt on the oppression of the peoples of the East by the murderous colonial policies of European nationsÕ (Marr 1934a (Marr [1924 , p. 1). MarrÕs critique had much in common with that of Foucault decades later. Both collapsed the distinction between factual accuracy and methodological rigor on the one hand and interpretation, generalization or conceptualization on the other. Thus, the formal methods that the comparativists, developed solely to establish genetic relationships between languages, were themselves rejected because linguists assumed the idea of the proto-language and limited their attention to Indo-European languages and those with a written Ôculture.Õ For Marr, as for Nietzsche before him, and for Foucault after him, evidence is simply a ploy to establish a ÔtruthÕ that is to oneÕs advantage. It was undoubtedly important to identify the ideological and institutional factors behind biases in selection and in generalization Ðfor instance, that linguists had generated a large amount of factual data on Sanskrit but much less on Dravidian or Kartvelian languages (Marr 1934a (Marr [1924 (Lenin 1964 (Lenin [1916 ; Bukharin 1929 Bukharin [1917 ), which fundamentally involved the extraction of capital, the Soviet state became an imperial power. While directly colonial relations did not return as a general trend imperial relations were very clearly established, while Marrist ÔdiscourseÕ deflected attention away from these realities. Foucault Ôto justify political quietism with sophisticated intellectualism, at the same time wishing to appear realistic, in touch with the world of power and realityÕ (Said 1983, p. 245) . What was forgotten was that the postcolonial critique remained rooted in the very principles they sought to expose.
